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FREEDOM AT HOME: STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND
MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS
LINDA M. VANZI*
Until the twentieth century, state constitutions were the primary guardians of individual rights. In fact, state bills of rights existed prior to the
federal constitution.' But when the Supreme Court "federalized" civil
liberties jurisprudence by applying the Bill of Rights to the states, most
state courts began to defer to the judgments of the United States Supreme
Court on individual liberty. 2 All state constitutions, however, have bills
of rights provisions protecting individuals from government actions. Until
recently, these guarantees were either ignored or interpreted co-extensively
with the bill of rights provision in the federal constitution.
As former Justice William Brennan counselled, however, "[t]he legal
revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed
to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for without it,
the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed." 3 And, in the
wake of eroding federal protection for fundamental rights, a new state
constitutional jurisprudence has begun to emerge. The federal constitution
provides a floor of minimum level protection for its citizens. Now, state
courts are reading their constitutions more expansively even where
the
4
state and federal constitutions have similar or identical language.
This Article addresses the multiplicity of accounts of a woman's procreative choice. In particular, it examines the funding of abortions under
Medicaid-the joint federal-state reimbursement medical assistance program established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act.' The Article
first provides an overview of the Medicaid Program and the Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid Program to restrict medicaid funding for abortion.
It then examines the federal right to privacy, and the constitutionality

* Linda Vanzi is a 1995 graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law. Currently,
she is serving as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable E. L. Mechem, Senior United States District
Judge for the District of New Mexico. The author wishes to thank the New Mexico Medicaid
Team-Michele Guttmann, Louise Melling, Maureen Sanders, Ann Scales, and David Stout-without
whom this article would not have been possible.
1. Richard Vuernick, State Constitutions as a Source of Individual Liberties: Expanding Protection for Abortion Funding Under Medicaid, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 185, 186 (1993) (noting that
"[iln our federalist system, the federal constitution was designed to protect states from an omnipotent
centralized government, while the state constitutions were enacted to protect individual citizens from
intrusive state governments."). In addition, the Federal Bill of Rights was modeled after provisions
in state constitutions. Id. (citing California v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975)).
2. Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment
on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 636 (1987) (stating that "state constitutional rights
litigation all but disappeared").
3. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HA.v. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
4. See e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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of abortion funding schemes based on an interpretation of the Federal
Constitution. Next, it analyzes the use of state constitutional challenges
to abortion funding statutes. Three states have followed United States
Supreme Court precedent and upheld restrictions on Medicaid funding
for abortion. Twelve others have found a greater degree of protection
for individual liberty than that found in the United States Constitution.
Finally, this Article provides a brief review of the pending constitutional
challenge to Medicaid funding of abortion in New Mexico. It then confirms
that the area of reproductive rights is one example of the large and vital
role of state constitutions in protecting and securing individual liberties.
TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND THE
HYDE AMENDMENT
Security Act
the
Social
A. Title XIX of
Congress first authorized the expenditure of Federal funds to enable
States to provide medical assistance to certain classes of needy persons
in 1965. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, or Medicaid, is one of6
several joint federal-state programs of assistance to needy Americans.
State participation in Medicaid is optional and States have broad parameters within which to determine the scope and extent of the assistance
offered. 7 However, once a state decides to participate, it must comply
with certain minimum requirements. 8
Two classes of persons may receive Medicaid assistance under Title
XIX of the Social Security Act-the "categorically needy" and the "medically needy." 9 Federal legislation does not specify the services which
states must offer within the mandated categories of care and services;
however, it does require participating states to set up reasonable standards
governing the extent of such services. 10 Crucial to this analysis is the
fact that Medicaid-participant states may, but need not, subsidize abortions
beyond those for which federal reimbursement is available."
I.

6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
7. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).
8. Id.
9. The ';categorically needy" include families with dependent children eligible for public assistance
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988), and the
aged, blind, and disabled eligible for benefits under the Supplemental Security Income program,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1988). A State must
furnish five types of services to qualified individuals. They include (1) inpatient hospital services,
(2) outpatient hospital services, (3) other laboratory and X-ray services, (4) skilled nursing services,
early periodic screening and diagnosis, and family planning services, and (5) physicians' services.
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l)-(5).
The "medically needy" include those who are under eighteen and pregnant, as well as pregnant
women who may not meet income requirements to qualify as "categorically needy," and other
needy people. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(ii) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
10. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 (1977) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and holding,
however, that as a matter of statutory construction, Title XIX does not require states to fund the
cost of non-therapeutic abortions when the states were funding medically necessary abortions for
financially needy persons as part of their medical programs).
11. McRae, 448 U.S. at 309 (stating that "[ijf Congress chooses to withdraw federal funding
for a particular service, a State is not obliged to continue to pay for that service as a condition
of continued federal financial support of other services.").
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B.

The Hyde Amendment
In 1976, Congress enacted the first federal restrictions on Medicaid
funding for abortions.' 2 Named after its original congressional sponsor,
Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, the "Hyde Amendment" is a
rider to the Labor-HEW Appropriations Act. The 1976 Amendment
limited federal reimbursement of abortions to cases in which "the life
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term."' 3
Similar restrictions passed Congress in 1977, 1978, and 1979.14
In 1979, Congress dropped the "severe and long-lasting health damage"
exception. 5 The resulting legislation further restricted the circumstances
under which coverage would be available. Today, reimbursement for
abortion is limited to cases in which continued pregnancy is life-threatening, to cases of ectopic pregnancy, and to certain cases involving rape
or incest.' 6 The legislation continues to provide that states participating
7
in Medicaid may choose not to fund abortions in their sole discretion.
II.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND ABORTION FUNDING
CHALLENGES UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

A.

The Federal Right to Privacy
In Griswold v. Connecticut,8 the United States Supreme Court first
recognized a right to privacy in procreative choice as a protected federal
constitutional right. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, several fundamental constitutional guarantees create a zone of privacy encompassing
"notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.' 9 The Court
held that a married couple's right to use contraceptives is implicit in the
couple's right to privacy. Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,20 the
Court extended the right to privacy to include the right of unmarried
couples to use contraceptives. The Eisenstadt decision separated the right
2
of reproductive freedom from the right of marriage. '
The right of privacy, or perhaps more accurately the right of heterosexuals to use birth control, was finally extended to the abortion context
in 1973. In the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade,22 the United States

12. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976).
13. Id.
14. The 1977 version was slightly broader than the 1976 version. It included two additional
categories of coverage, cases of "severe and long-lasting physical health damage" and "rape or
incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public
health service." Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977). There were no changes in the
1978 version. See Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978); Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93
Stat. 926 (1979).
15. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. at 926.
16. Pub. L. No. 96-536, § 109, 94 Stat. 3170 (1980).
17. Id.
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Id. at 485-86 (finding that several of the Bill of Rights guarantees protect the privacy interest
and create a "penumbra" or "zone" of privacy).
20. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
21. Id.
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Supreme Court held that the liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the freedom of a woman
to decide whether to end her pregnancy. The Court concluded, however,
that a pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right
of choice. According to the then all-male Court, legitimate state interests
limit a woman's fundamental right of procreational choice. These interests
are weighed differently as the woman progresses though the three trimesters of pregnancy.
The Court found that the state has two legitimate interests: the preservation of the health of the pregnant woman and the protection of
potential human life. 23 The Court concluded that because a woman's
right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy is fundamental, the
state must advance a compelling interest to regulate the pregnancy. 24 The
Court posited that the asserted state interests became sufficiently compelling to justify regulation in the second and third trimesters. 25 Thus,
Roe did not give a woman an unqualified right to an abortion. Rather,
the Court decided only that she is unqualifiedly protected from governmental interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate the
pregnancy in the first trimester of pregnancy.
Since Roe, there has been an erosion of federal protection in the
abortion context. The most important post-Roe decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 26 explicitly declined to overrule Roe. 27 Nevertheless,

the Court granted states more latitude in restricting access to abortions. 28
The Casey Court not only rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review
for evaluating the constitutionality of abortion regulations, but also cast
aside the trimester framework and adopted the less restrictive "undue
burden" standard. 29 In its retreat, the Court rebalanced the relative
interests of the state and pregnant women and reinforced the state's
interest in protecting maternal health and potential fetal life "from the
outset" of the pregnancy.3 0 Under this new standard, the right to choose
an abortion no longer enjoys the strong protection afforded other fundamental rights under the Federal Constitution.

23. Id. at 162.
24. Id. at 162-63. The Court reasoned that the mortality rate for women having abortions during
the first trimester is lower than the rate for pregnancies resulting in birth. Thus, the state has no
compelling interest in protecting the mother's health and cannot ban abortions during the first
trimester. Id. at 163. That decision is left to the pregnant woman and her physician.
25. Id. at 163-64. The Court ruled that during the second trimester, the state may protect only
its interest in the mother's health and not the fetus' life. Thus, a complete ban on abortions during
this period is not permitted. The Court then noted that at the onset of the third trimester, the
fetus typically becomes "viable." Because the state has a compelling interest in protecting the fetus
at that juncture, it may proscribe abortions during the third trimester except when necessary to
preserve the life or the health of the mother.
26. 506 U.S. 833 (1992).
27. Id. at 846-47 (holding that the substantive liberty guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment
barred states from absolutely banning abortions).
28. See id. at 877-78.
29. Id. at 878.
30. Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthoodv. Casey: Establishing
Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (1993).
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B. Federal Abortion Funding Cases
In a line of cases in 1977, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
the constitutionality of Medicaid abortion funding schemes and held that
a state may fund childbirth related expenses without funding medically

necessary abortions.3 Three years later, the Court determined that the
Hyde Amendment was constitutional.2 The Court was plainly concerned
that creating an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress
to subsidize all medically necessary abortions of pregnant women even
if Congress had not enacted the Medicaid program to subsidize other
medically necessary services. 3
In Maher v. Roe,3 4 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of

Connecticut's decision to refuse funding for non-therapeutic abortions35
under the state's Medicaid scheme on both equal protection and due
process grounds. On the equal protection question, the Court distinguished
between a state's interference with a woman's right to choose and the
state's decision to fund childbirth but not abortions. The Court decided
36
that indigent women are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes.
Under a rational basis standard, the state does not have to pay for nontherapeutic abortions even if it funds childbirth-related expenses.
On the due process question, the Court held that the statute did not
impinge on the fundamental right of choice guaranteed by the Constitution. In reaching its conclusion, the majority interpreted Roe to mean
that a woman merely had a fundamental right to be free of "unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy. 3 7 The Connecticut statute placed no direct obstacle in
the pregnant woman's path. It simply failed to ease her pre-existing
condition of poverty.

31. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-80 (1977);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977).
32. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980).
33. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 469; Harris, 448 U.S. at 318.
34. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
35. Therapeutic abortions are those that are medically necessary to protect the life or health of
the pregnant woman, while elective, or non-therapeutic abortions are generally considered everything
else, such as birth control or "mere convenience."
In Beal, Justice Brennan argued that there is no meaningful distinction between "elective" and
"medically necessary" abortions. "Elective" abortions must be considered a form of health care
since "[p]regnancy is unquestionably a condition requiring medical services." Beal, 432 U.S. at 449.
36. Maher, 432 U.S. at 470 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
29 (1973)). San Antonio involved a statutory system for financing public education which authorized
an ad valorem tax by each school district on property within the district to supplement funds
received by the State. Because of the variation in the amount of taxable properties within each
district, there were substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures. The Court held that
while important, education is not a right afforded either explicit or implicit protection by the Federal
Constitution. The Court in San Antonio noted that it never invoked strict scrutiny for reviewing
classifications based on wealth unless such classifications deprived a person of a fundamental right.
37. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (observing that "the Connecticut regulation places no obstaclesabsolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who
desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires.").
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Again, there was no reason for strict scrutiny. The Court found that
the state's regulation was a policy decision that was "rationally related"
to a "constitutionally permissible purpose" 3S-a preference for childbirth

over abortion. The Connecticut Medicaid restriction did not interfere
with a protected activity, but rather encouraged an alternative activity

which the legislature had previously approved.3 9
Justice Brennan dissented in Maher. He noted that by funding childbirth-related expenses but not abortion, the State has brought "financial
pressures on indigent women that force them to bear children they would

not otherwise have."

4

He criticized the majority for failing to recognize

burdens on the fundamental right to privacy and pointed to other abortion
statutes that the Court found unconstitutional
because they infringed on
41
the woman's right to procreative choice.
In Harris v. McRae,42 a bitterly divided Court upheld the constitutionality of the then-current version of the "Hyde Amendment." Under
Hyde, a state participating in the Medicaid program need not fund
medically necessary abortions when no federal reimbursement was allowed. 4 3 The Court again relied on the decision in Maher. It argued that
lack of federal funding placed no burden on a woman's right to decide
whether to have an abortion. 44 The Court reasoned that merely because

a woman has a right it does not give her an entitlement to have that
right reimbursed at state expense. 4 Thus, the majority concluded there
was no "affirmative funding obligation" in the Due Process Clause and
that the Hyde Amendment did not restrict the exercise of any constitutionally protected fundamental right. 6 Rather than view the Hyde

Amendment as a governmental restriction, the Court stated:
[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those

38. Id. at 478 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 474, 478-79.
40. Id. at 484.
41. Id. at 487 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding
that Missouri's requirement of spousal consent for an abortion was unconstitutional)).
42. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
43. Id. at 326.
44. Id. at 316.
45. Id.
46. Harris, 448 U.S. at 318. The Court also decided that the Hyde Amendment did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause or the Establishment Clause. Id. at 319. The Court countered the equal
protection argument by relying on the reasoning of Maher. See id. at 322. The Court noted that
because indigent women are not a suspect class, under a rational basis analysis, the Hyde Amendment's
goal of encouraging childbirth was rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
protecting potential life. Id. at 323-25 n.26.
In addition, the Court dismissed the appellees' contention that the Amendment violated the
Establishment Clause because it incorporated into law the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church
concerning the sinfulness of abortion and the time when life commences. Instead, the Court found
that just because the law "happen[ed] to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions," it did not contravene the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 319-20
(citation omitted) (noting that because "the Judaeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not
mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause,
enact laws prohibiting larceny.").
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not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The
financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy
the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but
47
rather of her indigency.

Both Maher and Harris sidestepped prior decisions showing that the
government's decision to fund one program and not another may be
unconstitutional if its purpose is to discourage the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. 4 A pregnant woman has a choice between two
alternatives. When the government decides to subsidize only childbirth,
it penalizes one of the constitutionally protected choices in much the
same fashion that the Arizona residence requirement penalized the indigent
patient's right to travel in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County. 49 In

this context, the Supreme Court has "permitted states to discriminate
between childbirth and abortion when allocating monies or providing
services" to indigent women. 0
III.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN
ABORTION FUNDING CASES

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that subsistence
or welfare payments are not fundamental rights. Such holdings prevent

any chance of successfully challenging Medicaid abortion funding restrictions under the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the future of reproductive freedom of poor women in this country depends largely on the
willingness of state courts to interpret the bills of rights in state constitutions as conferring more rights than the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. Some state courts have refused to do so.
Most, however, have been willing to diverge from federal precedent to
find a greater degree of protection using existing state constitutional

doctrine.

47. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. Justice Brennan again dissented, arguing that the State has no right
to use its power to burden a woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion. Id. at 330. Focusing
on the coercive nature of denying funds to indigent women, he stated: "[I1t is obvious that the
Hyde Amendment is nothing less than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the
Constitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not do directly." Id. at 331.
48. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (holding that an Arizona
statute requiring one year's residence in the county prior to being admitted to a hospital to receive
non-emergency care was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a
compelling interest); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that the burden for denying a
college group's application for recognition as a student organization fell on the administration and
that the local group's affiliation with a national organization, the administration's disagreement
with the group's philosophy, and its unsubstantiated fear of disruption were insufficient to warrant
a denial of official recognition unless the administration could prove the student group failed to
comply with campus regulations); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a state
may not grant unemployment compensation to most workers, but deny it to a worker who is
discharged because her religion prevents her from working on Saturday).
49. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
50. Kolbert & Gans, supra note 30, at 1156.
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"Flying in the Face of Our Own Existence"
To date, only Pennsylvania, Michigan and Kentucky, have upheld
abortion funding limitations under the equal protection clauses of their

A.

state constitutions." The clear trend in state constitutional law is to
conduct an independent analysis of each state's constitutional guarantees.
Nevertheless, the above three states did not recognize the important role

of state constitutions in safeguarding a woman's reproductive choice and,
as a result, have left poor women subject to continuing government

manipulation.

In Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare,5 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered the guarantees found in article I, section 1,"3 and article
III, § 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 Although the court acknowledged that it was free to interpret state constitutional provisions
more expansively than federal courts, it nevertheless adopted the United
States Supreme Court's framework of analysis for equal protection claims
brought under the Pennsylvania Constitution."
Pennsylvania's Constitution affords protection for abortion rights. However, the court defined the Plaintiff's claim as "the purported right to
have the state subsidize the individual exercise of a constitutionally pro'56
tected right, when it chooses to subsidize alternative constitutional rights.
The Commonwealth's constitution did not explicitly state the right to
such an entitlement. Thus, the court held that the right was not fundamental, and strict scrutiny was not appropriate.5 7 The court accepted
the majority's reasoning in McRae and found that the goal of favoring
childbirth over abortion satisfied even an intermediate level of scrutiny.58
In addition, the restriction violated neither the non-discrimination clause
of the Pennsylvania Constitution nor the Pennsylvania Equal Rights

51. See, e.g., Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985); Doe v. Department
of Social Serv., 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992); Doe v. Masten Childers, No. 94CI02183 (Ky. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 7, 1995).
52. 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985).
53. This section provides: "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness."
PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
54. This section provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case
which has been or can be provided for by general law .. . . Nor shall the General Assembly
PA. CONST.
indirectly enact any special or local law by the partial repeal of a general law .
art. III, § 32.
55. See Fischer, 502 A.2d at 121 (reasoning that "[a]lthough the view of the United States
Supreme Court concerning proper guidelines for its interpretation of the Federal Constitution is not
binding upon us in interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution, we agree that we should be guided
by the same principles in interpreting our Constitution." Id. (quoting Kroger v. O'Hara Township,
392 A.2d 266, 274 (Pa. 1978))).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 122 (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
324 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (noting that to hold that the preservation of
potential life is not important "is to fly in the face of our own existence," and that the funding
restriction was closely related-in fact "necessary" -to reach the Pennsylvania Legislature's goal of
preserving life)).
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Amendment. 9 The court determined that the non-discrimination clause
only applies when the State penalizes a person for the exercise of a
constitutionally protected freedom. The discriminatory funding scheme
had not "penalized [plaintiffs] for exercising their right to choose, but
has merely decided not to fund that choice in favor of an alternative
social policy." 6 The court failed to give any independent significance to
the clause preventing6 the State from denying "to any person the enjoyment
of any civil right." '
62
The Michigan Supreme Court in Doe v. Department of Social Services,
and the Kentucky court in Doe v. Masten Childers,63 both found that
selectively withholding funds for abortion while funding all other pregnancy related care did not impinge on the constitutional right to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy. The Michigan court found that neither
textual differences nor drafter's intent showed that the Michigan equal
protection clause provided broader protection than the parallel federal
clause. 64 The Kentucky court merely found that its equal protection clause
is coterminous with the federal provision. 65 Both courts held that the
restriction passed a rational basis test.
Thus, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Kentucky followed United States
Supreme Court precedent and simply adopted federal equal protection
analysis as their own. The inevitable result, however, was "'absolute

deferential conformity' with Supreme Court interpretations."6

State Constitutional Discourse: An Expansive Interpretation to
Protect Individual Autonomy
Since 1981, the courts of New Mexico, Montana, West Virginia, Idaho,
Illinois, New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, Oregon, Minnesota, Con-

B.

necticut, and Vermont have invoked their state constitutions to strike

59. The Pennsylvania non-discrimination clause provides:
"Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the
enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right."
PA. CONST. art. I, § 26.
The Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not
be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth . . .because of the sex of the individual." PA. CONST.
art. I, § 28.
60. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 124.
61. PA. CONST. art I, § 26.
62. 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992).
63. No. 94C102183, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 7, 1995).
64. Doe v. Department of Social Serv., 487 N.W.2d at 175 (noting that "the pattern suggests
a deliberate effort to duplicate the protection secured by the federal clause. Furthermore, a careful
examination of the record of the debates of the Constitutional Convention confirms this view.").
The court explicitly avoided the issue of whether the state constitution affords protection for abortion
rights and rejected the court of appeals' expansive reading of Michigan's equal protection guarantee.
See generally id.
65. Masten Childers, No. 94C02183, slip op. at 20.
66. Utter & Pittler, supra note 2, at 645. This "dual approach" has been harshly criticized as
a "non-approach" because it substitutes the judgment of the federal court for the independent legal
analysis of the state court concerning a state provision. Id. at 646.
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down statutes restricting abortion funding. 67 Each court has analyzed its
own state constitution and relied on interpretations by sister states to
develop a principled state constitutional jurisprudence. Some of these
state constitutions contained federal analogs; others had provisions, such
as the state Equal Rights Amendment, with no federal counterpart. None,
however, simply accepted its state constitution as a mere reiteration of
the federal charter.
The challenged state Medicaid statutes provided funding for all childbirth-related procedures except "medically necessary" abortions. 61 In each
of the cases, the court used a two-step analysis. First, a woman's right
to choose an abortion received broader protection under various provisions
in the respective state constitution. As a result, the decision to carry a
pregnancy to term and the decision to terminate a pregnancy have equal
constitutional dignity.
Second, the courts held that the state cannot discriminate between the
two choices. States routinely choose to confer public benefits upon their
citizens. Once a state makes that choice, however, the state constitution
mandates that it must do so in a non-discriminatory manner. This is
particularly true when important individual interests are at stake.
1. Step One: Recognizing a Woman's Constitutional Interest in her
Reproductive Choices
Several state courts first invalidated limitations on government funding
for abortion as an infringement of the fundamental right of procreative
67. See, e.g., New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C), slip op.
at 3 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995), appeal pending, No. 23239 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 1995);
Women's Health Ctr. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1993); Roe v. Harris, No. 96977
(Idaho Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1994); Doe v. Wright, No. 91-CH-1958 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994), leave
to file late appeal denied, No. 78512 (I11.Feb. 28, 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925
(N.J. 1982); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); Moe v.
Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Department
of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on statutory grounds, 687 P.2d
785 (Or. 1984) (en banc); Women of Minn. v. Steffen, No. MC 93-3995 (Minn. Dist. Ct., June
16, 1994) (appeal pending); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.3d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Doe v. Celani,
No. S81-84CnC (Vt. Super. Ct. May 26, 1986).
68. The definition of "medically necessary" has varied somewhat among the states. Oregon, for
example, found that there was no definition of the phrase "medically indicated" and were thus,
"not certain what it means in the context of abortions, as compared to other elective surgical
procedures." Planned ParenthoodAss'n, 663 P.2d at 1251 (providing its own "working definition"
and considering an abortion to be medically necessary "when that surgical procedure is required,
in a physician's opinion, because specified medical problems may be caused or aggravated by the
pregnancy endangering the health of the woman." Id. at 1252). See also Women's Health Ctr.,
446 S.E.2d at 661 n.4 (stating that procedure is determined to be medically necessary when it is
"medically advisable by the attending physician in light of physical, emotional, psychological, familial,
or age factors (or a combination thereof) relevant to the well-being of the patient." (citation
omitted)); Byrne, 450 A.2d at 930 (stating that a physician may consider (1) physical, emotional,
and psychological factors; (2) family reasons; (3) age (citing N.J. AmriaN CODE § 10:53-1 to -14(b));
Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 393 ("the consulting physician believes that [the] abortion is medically indicated,
but cannot certify that the procedure is necessary to prevent death"); Maher, 515 A.2d at 137
(finding that a physician must certify that "the abortion is medically necessary for the patient's
health").
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choice guaranteed by their state constitutions.6 9 These states have recognized the importance of a pregnant woman's right to choose in a
variety of ways. The right of choice, rooted in the state constitution's
"privacy" clause, has been found either in the "due process" clause,
"inalienable rights" clause, or "open courts" provisions. One court has
found an implicit right to privacy rooted in the state's common law. 70
Two states courts looked to their due process clauses to find a fundamental right to reproductive choice. First, the Superior Court of Con-

necticut in Doe v. Maher" relied on Article I, section 10 of the state
constitution in reaching its decision.12 It looked first to federal precedent,
however, and determined "[t]he inquiry is whether a right involved 'is
of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions."' 73 Using principles derived from Roe
and its progeny, the court concluded that the right to privacy is "implicit
in Connecticut's ordered liberty." '74 In addition, the right to privacy was
fundamental in the state constitution's language, history, and previous
interpretation. 75 Specifically, the framers of the state constitution of 1818
or "natural rights" as "deeply rooted in the
recognized fundamental
' 76
core of liberty."

69. See, e.g., Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C); Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 399 (finding that the Massachusetts
provision prohibiting use of state funds for medically necessary abortions violated the state constitution, which protects the choice to beget or bear children); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights,
625 P.2d at 804 (noting that the California Constitution contains an explicit right to privacy); Byrne,
450 A.2d at 934 (determining that state right to privacy includes woman's right to control her own
body and to choose whether to terminate the pregnancy or bear child); Planned Parenthood Ass'n,
663 P.2d at 785 (stating that the state constitution protects a women's right to terminate pregnancy);
Maher, 515 A.2d at 150 (stating that the state constitution protects the right to privacy, including
procreative choice); Celani, No. $81-84CnC (finding that denial of funding for medically necessary
abortion violates state constitutional common benefit and safety clauses).
70. Women of Minn. v. Steffen, No. 93-3995, slip op. at 14 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 16, 1994)
(on appeal). The court cited Roe for the proposition that the right to privacy encompasses abortion,
but then relied heavily on prior state court decisions to further support the fundamental nature of
the right. Id., at 13 (citation omitted). The court found that although judicial recognition of the
right of privacy in Minnesota was relatively recent, the preservation of bodily integrity has been
firmly rooted in its law for centuries. Id. at 14. Thus, "[rleproductive freedom is an integral aspect
of the right of personal integrity guarded by Minnesota common law." Id.
71. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
72. Connecticut's due process clause provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay." CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
73. Maher, 515 A.2d at 149 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). The court's
use of federal law, however, was "on a case-by-case basis," and the federal principles were used
"in the formulation of state constitutional law." Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 150 (describing the right to privacy in expansive terms and noting that privacy
"encompasses the doctor-patient relationship regarding the woman's health, including the physician's
right to advise the woman on the abortion decision based upon her well-being").
75. Id. at 148-49. The court reasoned that the framers of the 1818 constitution intended that
"the right of privacy is . . . implicitly guaranteed under our state charter of liberty." Id. at 148.
The court noted that the Connecticut Constitution not only constrained governmental power, but
also conferred positive rights upon the people, some of which were enumerated, others which were
implied. id. Among these implied rights were fundamental or 'natural rights,' which the people
took for granted as being deeply rooted in the core of liberty." Id.
76. Id. at 148. The court quoted Justice Zephaniah Swift, who was instrumental in the drafting
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Second, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Moe v. Secretary of
Administration & Finance77 applied its due process provision to invalidate
a Medicaid funding scheme that subsidized only abortions to save the
mother's life. 78 The restriction impermissibly burdened an implicit right
to privacy stemming from article X of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. 79 The court relied heavily on federal law to define the nature of
the right to privacy.80 It then looked to prior case law interpreting the
state constitution. The court explained that the right to privacy protecting
family, sexuality and reproductive freedom is "but one aspect of a far
broader [grant]" of personal autonomy. 8 Thus, under the Massachusetts

constitution, a woman "has a strong interest in being free from non8' 2

consensual invasion of [her] bodily integrity.
Many state constitutions contain expansive guarantees of safety, liberty,and happiness that have no parallel in the Federal Constitution. Socalled inalienable rights or inherent rights are those which are "beyond
the scope of governmental power to control or the free human being to
surrender. ' 83 The Vermont Constitution's inalienable rights provision, like
that in the New Mexico, New Jersey, and Idaho constitutions, is textually
different from the United States Constitution.8 4 Instead of focusing on
the right to privacy, however, the Vermont Superior Court in Doe v.
Celan l5 highlighted the "right to safety" provision in the inalienable
rights clause and found that a citizen cannot safeguard that right if her
health is threatened. 86 "Health is central to [one's] personal safety and
and adoption of the constitution of 1818. In defending natural rights, he said "[n]atural rights
consist in the enjoyment and exercise of a power to do as we think proper, without any other
restraint than what results from the law of nature, or what may be denominated the moral law
.... " Id. (quoting 1 SWIFT, DIGEST 15 (1822); Christopher Collier, The Connecticut Declaration
of Rights Before the Constitution of 1818: A Victim of Revolutionary Redefinition, 15 CONN. L.
REV. 87, 94-97 (1982)).
77. 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
78. The plaintiffs also alleged an equal protection and Equal Rights Amendment violation.
However, because the court agreed that the challenged restriction impermissibly burdened a right
protected by the state constitutional guarantee of due process, it did not reach the alternative
grounds of invalidity. Id. at 397.
79. The Massachusetts due process clause provides: "Each individual of the society has a right
to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws.
He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of this protection.
... MASS.
CON T. art. X.
80. Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 398 (stating that "[a]lthough we are not unaware of the criticism leveled
at Roe . . . , we have accepted the formulation of rights that it announced as an integral part of
our jurisprudence.'.').
81. Id. This autonomy demands that "the sanctity of individual free choice" and the freedom
of "bodily integrity" be fundamental. Id. at 399 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch.
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)).
82. Id. (quoting In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980)).
83. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 15-3 (2d ed. 1988).
84. The Vermont Constitution provides "[t]hat all men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst which are the enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety ....
" VT. CONST. art. I, ch. 1.
85. No. $81-84CnC (Vt. Super. Ct. 1986).
86. Id. at 9 (noting that the "case does not present an issue involving the freedom of choice
to obtain an abortion so much as it concerns an unequal protection by the State of indigent
inhabitants' unconstitutionally [sic] protected right to personal health, safety and happiness.").
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happiness. 8 7 Therefore, "one's safety is integrally at risk" if one's health
is being threatened. 8 The constitutionally guaranteed inalienable right to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety includes the availability of medically necessary services.
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Right to Choose v. Byrne"9
noted that the language of the New Jersey Constitution is more expansive
than that of the Federal Constitution ° After examining its own case
law, the court established that an individual's right to privacy extended
to a variety of areas, including a woman's personal right to control her
body and life. 9 ' Moreover, by asserting the right to life, liberty and the
framers made the right of privacy
pursuit of safety and happiness, the
92
implicit in the 1844 Constitution.

The United States Supreme Court in Maher and Harris derogated a
woman's interest by allowing the state to impose its own values when
benefits are allocated. 93 Twelve state courts, however, have recognized
the independent role of their state constitutions. They have found that
the interests of a pregnant woman simply cannot be weighed. These
courts regard their constitutions as an important supplement to the federal
right to privacy. In addition, the state constitutional provisions act as
an independent guarantor of protection of women's rights.
Step Two: The Equal Importance of Constitutionally Protected
Choices
Some courts have held that the state cannot discriminate when dispensing
funds for medically necessary procedures under the state equal protection
clause, 94 or privileges and immunities clause. 95 However, the driving force
2.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
90. The New Jersey Constitution provides: "All persons are by nature free and independent,
and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.
91. Byrne, 450 A.2d at 933 (citing In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nor., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)) (observing
that the state right to privacy had been invoked to protect adult consensual sexual conduct, the
right to sterilization, and the right to terminate life support. The common thread running through
these cases was the idea that sometimes "an individual's right to control her own body and life
overrides the state's general interest in preserving life." Id.).
92. 450 A.2d at 933 (citing Heckel, The Bill of Rights, in II CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1947, 1336, 1339 (1951)).
93. See supra notes 33-41, 42-47 and accompanying text.
94. See Women of Minn. v. Steffen, No. 93-3995 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 16, 1994) (on appeal)
(noting that the state supreme court has "repeatedly interpreted Minnesota's equal protection guarantee
to afford greater protection of individual liberties than that afforded by the federal constitution."
Id. at 17. The creation of the two classifications-women obtaining funding if they carried to term
and women choosing an abortion-were arbitrary and unreasonable. Moreover, the court noted that
the provision posed an "obstacle" because it conditioned payment "upon the indigent woman's
waiver of her constitutional right." Id. at 15, 17-23.).
95. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247 (Or.
Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984). Unlike most states, the Oregon
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behind most of the Medicaid funding cases has been the adoption of
the principle of neutrality. The neutrality doctrine is independent of the
equal protection guarantee.96 Nevertheless, the application of the neutrality
doctrine is really one of equality jurisprudence and fundamental fairness.
In the abortion funding context, the neutrality principle recognizes that
the state is under no obligation to support financially a woman's exercise
of her fundamental right to reproductive choice. Once it chooses to do

so, however, the state must not discriminate in its assistance. Otherwise,
a poor woman who cannot afford appropriate medical care must forego
her constitutional right of reproductive choice when the state subsidizes
one option but not the other. 97

Justice Brennan's dissenting opinions in both Maher and Harris acknowledged the dilemma that indigent women face when the government
influences their constitutionally protected right of reproductive choice. 98

Similarly, virtually every state court that has found a constitutional basis
for requiring nondiscrimination in government funding of reproductive
health services has recognized the coercive effect of selective subsidies. 99
As one court noted,
[F]rom a realistic perspective, we cannot characterize the statutory
scheme as merely providing a public benefit which the individual
recipient is free to accept or refuse without any impairment of her
Constitution does not contain an equal protection clause, a due process clause or a privacy clause.
The Oregon Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of
citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens." OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
The Oregon Court of Appeals analyzed the Oregon Privileges and Immunities Clause in equal
protection terms. The court rejected the defendants' contention that the classification was based on
wealth and found that the distinction between poor and rich was created only by the financial
eligibility criteria for the medical assistance program. The court concluded: "It may well be that
if the medical assistance program is a comprehensive one providing all medically necessary services
for men but not for women if those services involve an abortion, the program denies equal privileges
to women because they are women." Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 663 P.2d at 1260.
96. Under federal law, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection mandates that
people who are situated similarly will be treated similarly. The principle of neutrality, on the other
hand, is rooted in First Amendment doctrine and forbids the state to use its power to influence
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(striking down an Arkansas law prohibiting the teaching of evolution and noting that government
may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion at all, and it may not aid,
foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the "the militant
opposite." The First Amendment, the Court said, mandates government neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and non-religion.).
97. Thus, the government is not free "to achieve with carrots what [it] is forbidden to achieve
with sticks." TRIE, supra note 83, at 933 n.77.
98. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 487-89; Harris, 448 U.S. at 331.
99. See, e.g., Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 396 ("For a doctor who cannot afford to work for nothing,
and a woman who cannot afford to pay him, the State's refusal to fund an abortion is as effective
as 'interdiction' . . . as would ever be necessary.") (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 11819 n.7 (1976)); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights, 625 P.2d at 793 (recognizing coerciveness of
funding ban); Byrne, 450 A.2d at 935 ("nor is it neutral to provide one woman with the means
to protect her life at the expense of a fetus, and to force another woman to sacrifice her health
to protect a potential life." (emphasis added)); Maher, 515 A.2d at 152 ("[T]he regulation impinges
upon those constitutional rights to the same practical extent as if the state were to affirmatively
rule that poor women were prohibited from obtaining an abortion."); Women's Health Ctr. v.
Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 664 (W. Va. 1993) (finding that "[t]here is a federally-created right of
privacy that we are required to enforce in a non-discriminatory manner .... ).
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constitutional rights. On the contrary, the state is utilizing its resources
to ensure that women' who are too poor to obtain medical care on
their own will exercise their right of procreative choice only in the
manner approved by the state.100
State courts in California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut further analogized between the discriminatory funding of childbirth but not abortion,
and the selective allocation of other government benefits to promote the
exercise of constitutional rights in a state-approved manner. 10' In each
case, the court had earlier held that the State cannot subsidize one activity
and penalize another.
For example, the California Supreme Court in Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers'0 2 discussed two cases. The first invalidated
a state program allowing private organizations to use public schools for
public meetings but excluding "subversive elements" from the use of the
property. 03 The second reinstated a nurse's aide at a state-owned hospital
who was dismissed as a result of political activity." °4 The California
Supreme Court found that neutrality in supporting the exercise of constitutional rights in the area of reproductive choice, is no less important
than when free speech or the right to vote is at stake. 0 5 Neither of the
cases cited about the selective allocation of government benefits involved
the use of state funds. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that as the state
could not bar facilities from groups whose speech and association the
state sought to suppress, neither could it impose a disfavored opinion
about abortion by denying health care subsidies to a woman who sought
to end her pregnancy.' l°
The neutrality principle potentially offers an important source of constitutional protection. In the first instance, the federal two-tiered equal
protection analysis does not bind state courts. Moreover, state courts do
not feel compelled to justify a divergence. Instead, by adopting the equal
protection framework and weaving it together with principles of neutrality,
courts have found a constitutional basis for requiring non-discrimination
in government funding of reproductive services.

100. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 793 (Cal. 1991).
101. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights, 625 P.2d at 785, 787-88; Moe, 417 N.E.2d
at 401; Maher, 515 A.2d at 151 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that a state
college cannot constitutionally withhold official recognition from a student group and bar it from
otherwise open facility on grounds that the administration dislikes its views)). Just as the State
may, for example, use public funds to inform voters about a tax scheme, it may not advocate a
position on the tax. Similarly, a State cannot subsidize one alternative and not another.
102. 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
103. Id. at 785, 787-88 (citing Danskin v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 171 P.2d 885 (Cal.
1946)) (reasoning that just as the state could not bar those who wanted to use public property for
speech and association the state sought to suppress, it could not deny health care subsidies to those
who sought to use funds for an abortion).
104. Id. at 786-88 (citing Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1966))
(characterizing the issue as one where the state sought to exclude potential recipients from governmental
benefit programs solely on the basis of their exercise of constitutional rights).
105. See Kolbert & Gans, supra note 29, at 1165.
106. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights, 625 P.2d at 785, 787-89.
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C. Rights Protections Not Contained in the Federal Constitution:
Gender Equality Jurisprudence
Some courts have invoked their state equal rights amendments (ERAs)
to find that restrictive abortion laws violate gender-based equality guarantees under the state constitution. Because state ERAs have no federal
counterpart, they are an important and largely untapped source of protection for women.
Before the enactment of the Federal Equal Pay Act in 1963 and Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, differences in the legal treatment of the sexes survived a variety
of constitutional attacks. The underlying social and legal attitudes of
courts routinely reinforced stereotypes of women and their role in society.
Laws were upheld providing special protection to women in recognition
of the differences in the physical capacities of the sexes and of the general
weaker bargaining position of women in the labor market. 0 7
Since the 1970s, however, the Court has elevated the legal status of
women by giving more than minimal review to gender based classifications.
Thus, a statute preferring men over women as administrators of estates

is unconstitutional; 0° and a statute allowing a serviceman to claim his

wife as dependent (whether or not she was dependent on him), but
prohibiting the servicewoman from claiming her husband as a dependent
unless he depended on her for more than one-half of his support, is
constitutionally infirm. 109
The Roe Court repeatedly maintained that the decision to choose an
abortion belongs to the pregnant woman. Thus, the right to choose and
the right to retain control over one's body ostensibly diminished the gap

107. See, e.g., In re Mahaffay's Estate, 254 P. 875 (Mont. 1927) (holding that a statute requiring
a husband to consent to a wife's will depriving him of more than two-thirds of her estate did not
violate the equal protection guarantee though the husband could make such a disposition without
the wife's consent); Carrithers v. City of Shelbyville, 104 S.W. 744 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907) (a law
providing that only resident voters could protest the annexation of their property by a municipality
was consistent with the equal protection guarantee though women could not protest such annexation
because they were not privileged to vote at the time); Hall v. State, 187 So. 392 (Fla. 1939) (states
could constitutionally prevent women from selling intoxicating beverages or from serving as jurors);
Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656 (Mass. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1932). The
United States Supreme Court even held that a woman could constitutionally be denied a license to
practice law on the mere grounds of her sex. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
These attitudes are best illustrated by the concurring opinion of Justice Bradley. In his view,
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions
of womanhood ....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things,
and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.
Id. at 141-42.
108. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
109. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (holding that a statute which forbade the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of
21 and to females under the age of 18 violated the equal protection clause).

Summer 19961

FREEDOM AT HOME

between the legal status of women and men. Justice O'Connor in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey"0 noted that for the past twenty years, women have
relied on Roe's constitutional protections:
[Flor two decades of economic and social developments, people have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives."'
As shown by Harris v. McRae,"2 however, sexual equality was not an
issue for the Court.
Voters defeated the Federal Equal Rights Amendment in 1982."1 However, more than a third of the states have explicit ERAs that ban sex
discrimination.'" 4 Because there is no federal counterpart, these states
have been free to develop an independent constitutional jurisprudence
and paradigms of gender-discrimination doctrines. States are not uniform
in their construction of ERAs." 5 Nevertheless, the equality guarantees of
the amendments provide an important rationale for protecting a woman's
reproductive choice. Some courts have suggested that laws restricting
funding for abortion do not discriminate between men and women because

110. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
111. Id. at 856.
112. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding the right to choose as an issue of abstract personal privacy
rather than a question of sexual equality).
113. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment was passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and
submitted to the legislatures of the states for ratification as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution. It declared that: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972).
114. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 1972); CoLo. CoNsT. art. II, § 29 (amended
1972); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 (amended 1974); HAW. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3 (amended 1972); ILL.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 1974); ME. CoNsT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
art. 46 (amended 1972); MASS. CoNsT. Pt. I, art. 1 (amended 1976); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4
(amended 1972); N.H. CoNsT. part I, art. 2 (amended 1974); N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 18 (amended
1973); PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (amended 1971); TEX. CoNsT. art. I, § 3a (amended 1972); VA.
CONST. art. 1, § 11 (amended 1971); WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1 (amended 1972).
115. Construction has ranged from a strict interpretation to a meaningless interpretation. Adopting
the "literal" interpretation, some courts have interpreted their ERAs as prohibiting the government
from making any distinctions based on sex. See, e.g., Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 904-05 (Md.
1977) ("[Tlhe 'broad, sweeping, mandatory language' of the [state ERA] is cogent evidence that
the people of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and women."); National Elec.
Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1983) ("The ERA absolutely
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex . . . . and absolutely prohibits the sacrifice of equality
for any state interest, no matter how compelling .... "). Some courts use a strict scrutiny standard,
thus invalidating all sex-based classifications that are not reasonably related to a compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 161 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); People v. Ellis, 311
N.E.2d 98, 101 (I11.1974); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d
284, 291 (Mass. 1979); In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987); Phelps v. Bing, 316 N.E.2d
775 (I11. 1974). Finally, others construe the ERA as permitting any classification based on sex so
long as the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Archer v.
Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707 (Va. 1973).
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only women get abortions. 1 6 Others take an opposing view. They point
out that men can protect their health and exercise their procreative choices
free of governmental interference. The impact of abortion restrictions
falls on a class composed only of women because only women get
abortions. Thus, restrictive legislation coerces only women to continue
7
their pregnancies to term and singles them out for adverse treatment."
The Connecticut court, holding to the latter view, invalidated funding
restrictions under its equal rights amendments. In 1986, the court in Doe
v. Maher"8 found that the funding of childbirth, but not abortion,
discriminated on the basis of sex:
[U]nder the medicaid program, all the medical expenses necessary to
restore the male to health are paid and likewise for the female except
for therapeutic abortions that are not life-threatening. [In addition,]
all the male's medical expenses associated with their reproductive
health, for family planning and for conditions unique to his sex are
the medically
paid and the same is provided for women except for
9
necessary abortion that does not endanger her life."
The court noted that such exceptions are neither an accident of biology
20
Rather,
nor the incidental effect of a policy of promoting childbirth.
[their]
and
biology
"women's
which
in
history
long
a
of
part
are
they
ability to bear children have been used as a basis for discrimination
against them .... ",121 The court found that the funding ban distributes
benefits in a manner that reflects unfair stereotypes about women's proper
roles, penalizing women who fail to conform to the traditional belief
22 The
that one of their primary purposes is to bear and raise children.
Connecticut court's use of its state ERA to invalidate restrictive abortion
funding regulations expands the privacy/liberty view that a woman has
a right to control her own body. In turn, that view gives her similar
control over the definition of her role in society.
When the state leaves a woman with no alternative but to continue
an unwanted pregnancy, it perpetuates sex-oriented discrimination. The

116. See Fisher v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985).
In other words, such laws do not distinguish "between men and women, but between pregnant
persons seeking an abortion, all of whom were women, and non-pregnant persons, men and women,
who would have no need for an abortion." Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Personal
Autonomy: The Lawyering Perspective, 11 CoOLEY L. REV. 773, 795 (1994).
117. Kolbert & Gans, supra note 29, at 1167 (noting that the impact of abortion restrictions falls
only on a class composed of women, while men can protect their health and exercise their procreative
choices free of governmental interference).
118. 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
119. Id. The court stated, "[piregnancy is a condition unique to women, and the ability to become
pregnant is a primary characteristic of the female sex. Thus, any classification which relies on
pregnancy as the determinative criterion is a distinction based on sex." Id. (quoting Massachusetts
Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978)).
120. Id. at 159-60.
is absolutely clear that the framers
121. Maher, 515 A.2d at 159. The court also noted that "[ilt
intended that pregnancy discrimination would come with the purview of the sex discrimination
prohibited by Connecticut's ERA . .." Id. at 160; see generally Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
122. Id.

Summer 19961

FREEDOM AT HOME

451

language found throughout the Casey opinion affirms the connection
between the right of reproductive choice and equality. Anything less
would be "[t]o give society-especially a male-dominated society-the
power to sentence women to childbearing against their will [and] is to
delegate to some a sweeping and unaccountable authority over the lives
' 123
of others.
IV.

NEW MEXICO ACCEPTS THE CHALLENGE

New Mexico is in the vanguard of states to find that a woman has
not only a right to choose, but a right to effectuate that choice. New
Mexico provides public assistance, including medical assistance, to needy
men and women throughout the state. 124 Since December 1, 1994, New
Mexico has extended assistance to indigent women in need of medically
necessary abortions. 125 The Department of Health and Human Services
(HSD), however, promulgated a regulation, to have taken effect on May
1, 1995, that would limit medical assistance for abortions to mirror the
Federal Medicaid program. 26 Thus, abortions would only be available
when the pregnancy endangers a woman's life, the pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest, or the pregnancy is ectopic.
In New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Danfelser,127 the plaintiffs
challenged the proposed regulation as violative of the state constitutional
guarantees of due process, inherent rights, equal protection, and equal
rights. On July 3, 1995, the New Mexico district court granted the
plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction, invalidating the proposed
regulation. At the time of this Article's publication, Danfelser was pending
in the New Mexico Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the district court's
opinion in Danfelser provides a reasoned basis for recognizing the independent guarantees of the New Mexico Constitution.
In a case of first impression, Judge Steve Herrera noted at the outset
that the Federal Constitution does not limit the New Mexico Constitution. 128 Indeed, New Mexico has a long history of providing its citizens
broader protections than the federal charter. 29

123. TRIBE, supra note 82, at § 15-10 (noting that any such allocation of power is a detriment
of women as a class given the number of ways in which unwanted pregnancy and unwanted children
burden the participation of women as equals in society).
124. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2-9 (Supp. 1994). Persons eligible for Medicaid receive comprehensive coverage of medically necessary services, including physician, hospital, laboratory, hospice,
reproductive health, and midwife services. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2-12.
125. MEDICAL AsSISTANCE DISION PROVIDER MANuAl reg.. 766.3 (N.M 1994).

126. Human Serv. Reg., N.M., Final Reg. Governing Pregnancy Termination Procedures (Apr.
19,

1995).
127. No. SF 95-867(C) (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995), appeal pending, No. 23239 (N.M. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 23, 1995).
128. Id. at 3 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 435, 863 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1993)). See
also City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 114 N.M. 537, 544-45, 843 P.2d 839, 846-47 (Ct. App.), cert.

denied, 114 N.M. 532, 843 P.2d 375 (1992) (stating that "federal decisions do not control the
nature and scope of the rights guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution."); Blea v. City of
Espanola, 117 N.M. 217, 221, 870 P.2d 755, 759 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 328, 871 P.2d
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Utilizing a framework similar to that of sister states, the district court
first looked to the New Mexico due process clause, 130 the inherent rights

clause,'

and Roe and Casey to determine the fundamental nature of

the right at stake. 3 2 The court looked to the state constitution and
rejected federal precedent. Significantly, the court found that the supreme
had already explicitly
court in Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez,'

stated that New Mexicans have a "legally protected interest in limiting
the size of their famil[ies].' 13 4 Moreover, "[tihe choice not to procreate,
as part of one's right to privacy, has become (subject to certain limitations)
a Constitutional guarantee."' 3 5
Once the fundamental right to privacy was established, the court applied
the neutrality doctrine. The principle of neutrality is not a new concept
in New Mexico. In 1990, the New Mexico Supreme Court made clear
it
that "[s]o long as the state chooses to provide particular rights ...
may not limit the exercise of such rights selectively.'1 6 In addition, the
state attorney general has repeatedly stated that when subsidizing the

rights to free speech, to vote, and to a free press, the State must be

984 (1994) (finding that the New Mexico Supreme Court has "continued its expansion of rights in
favor of the citizen").
129. See Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C), slip op. at 3 (citing State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 870
P.2d 103 (1994); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 435, 863 P.2d 1052, 1956 (1993); State v.
Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989)). See also Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d
117 (1994), rev'g, 113 N.M. 421, 827 P.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1991).
Almost ten years ago, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
[As] the ultimate arbiters of the law of New Mexico[, we] are not bound to give
the same meaning to the New Mexico Constitution as the United States Supreme
Court places upon the United States Constitution, even in construing provisions
having wording that is identical, or substantially so, 'unless such interpretations
purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed the entire citizenry under the federal
charter.'
State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 356, 552 P.2d 787, 792 (1976) (quoting People v.
Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112 (Cal. 1975), overruled on other grounds, State v. Rondeau, 89
N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976).
130. The New Mexico due process clause provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law . . ." N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 18.
131. The New Mexico inherent rights clause provides:
All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable
rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety
and happiness.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4. See California First Bank v. State, 11l N.M. 64, 76, 801 P.2d 646, 658
(1990) (finding the inherent rights clause more expansive and affirmative than the Federal Constitution); State v. Sutton, 112 N.M. 449, 455, 816 P.2d 518, 524 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112
N.M. 308, 815 P.2d 161 (1991) (stating that inherent rights clause "contain[s] very general language
protecting a variety of rights.").
132. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C), slip op. at 11-12.
133. 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991).
134. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C), slip op. at 12 (citing Lovelace, III N.M. at 346, 805 P.2d
at 613 (1991)).
135. Id.
136. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 627, 798 P.2d 571, 577 (1990) (holding that
once the state chose to assist the exercise of the fundamental right of access to the courts by
waiving sovereign immunity and affording litigants the right to sue a government tortfeasor, the
state could not treat a municipal tort victim differently from other tort victims "unless the limitation
[was] justified by a counterbalanced state interest of sufficient weight.").
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"evenhanded," "equal," and "non-discriminatory.' '3 7 In the abortion
funding context, Judge Herrera noted "[tihis withholding of State funds
imposes a discriminatory burden on the poorest of the poor and only
affects women."' 3 8 The neutrality doctrine is fundamental to the concept
of individual rights in New Mexico.
New Mexico overwhelmingly ratified its Equal Rights Amendment in
1973.19 The state ERA explicitly guarantees the equality of women and
men. ,40 New Mexico courts have had the opportunity to analyze the ERA
in varying contexts almost since its ratification. 4 Guided by those decisions, the district court found that the funding regulation "necessarily
discriminate[d] on the basis of gender.' ' 42 Judge Herrera found it "illogical to suggest that the people of the State of New Mexico, the same
people who recently affirmed the rights of all of its citizens to 'Equality
1 43
of Rights Under Law,' would deny basic health choices to poor women.'
New Mexico has long drawn distinctions between the state constitution
and the Federal Constitution when construing a state provision that is
different from the federal counterpart, either textually or historically.
The district court in Danfelser affirmed that New Mexico continues to
preserve her autonomy. For New Mexicans, the Federal Constitution is
not the last line of defense. The abortion funding issue has yet to be
resolved by the New Mexico Supreme Court. If the supreme court holds
to its tradition of independently analyzing the state constitution, however,
poor New Mexico women will continue to be afforded the same guarantees
as all other citizens of the state.
V.

CONCLUSION

The challenges to restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortions have
provided a useful illustration for developing a principled basis for in-

137. See 1992 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 3, at 5 (May 5,.1992) (legislature may make space at
the state capitol available for media's use provided the procedure for allocating the space is
"evenhanded"); 1985 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 6, at 2 (Mar. 29, 1985) (local school boards or
districts "may expend public funds to inform voters . . . [but] may not, however, use public funds
to advocate a position on the tax .... "); 1964 N.M. ATT'Y GEN. REP. 606, 607 (state fair
commission may lease fair grounds to private groups so long as the leasing is done "on a nondiscriminatory or equal basis").
138. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C), slip op. at 12.
139. New Mexico's Equal Rights Amendment provides: "Equality of rights under law shall not
be denied on account of the sex of any person." N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
140. See English v. Sanchez, 110 N.M. 343, 346, 796 P.2d 236, 239 (1990) (stating that the ERA
mandates "equality of the rights" between sexes); State v. Sandoval, 98 N.M. 417, 419, 796 P.2d
485, 487 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the Amendment requires the State of New Mexico to "treat
all persons alike, regardless of sex.").
141. See Swink v. Fingado, 115 N.M. 275, 279-80, 850 P.2d 978, 982-83 (1993) (ensuring equal
treatment of women and men in domestic relations law); State v. Gonzales, III N.M. 590, 59899, 808 P.2d 40, 48-49 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 11 N.M. 416, 806 P.2d 65 (1991) (jury selection);
State v. Sandoval, 98 N.M. 417, 418-19, 649 P.2d 485, 486-87 (Ct. App. 1982) (criminal prosecutions);
Schaab v. Schaab, 87 N.M. 220, 223, 531 P.2d 954, 957 (1974) (state alimony statute must treat
husband and wife with exact equality). See also 1975 N.M. AT'VY GEN. REP. 193 (implicitly rejecting
stereotypes of women as unfit for military service).
142. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C), slip op. at 14.
143. Id. at 13.

454

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 26

terpreting state constitutions. There has been diminishing federal protection for reproductive rights, and for women's access to abortions, for
a number years. In the wake of these constitutional limitations, judicially
activist courts have used state constitutions as a successful alternative.
In addition to implicit guarantees to the right to privacy, the development
of neutrality principles and use of state ERAs have provided a remedy
against governmental discrimination in reproductive decision-making. While
no two cases are alike, the abortion funding cases provide a powerful
model for analysis of state constitutional guarantees.

